Chile Why - Revolutionary Communist Group by unknown
• 
Revolullonary Communlsl Group 10 p 

.. 
,• 
·i 
•. 
. . . 
,' 
INTRODUCTION. 
: ~. 
• ~· e ... -
,,,...7 . 
... ... -
. - ' 
... 
Ti1e task of building an international solidarity campaign to assist the 
Chilean resistancG against the junta i '"' an urgent pr~-oriJ~y~ ·: Differences 
of opinion on the Chilean experience should not act as a barrier to united 
' 
.. ..,,,..- J . .. ... 
action on demands which · a~e objectively in the interest of the .. Chilean 
. .. '. . 
a np _ ~ritish working c.l.ass •. The Re'Jolt _ip~ary Communist Group is actively 
.J, I ... > '. 
.,- . . 
wor~ing to~ar·ds the building of an international solidarity ~arnpaign to 
aid the . Chilean people~ All organis~tions 9 all sections of the labour 
movement, a~d ~11 individals~ re~dy to fight for an end to all diplomatic 9 
. . 
l• 
military and trading relations with -the junta 9 should. af·filiate to 7 and 
-· • l 
,. . 
participate in 9 the Ci.ile Solidarity Campaigno ,_., . 
. . 
... . .. 
... 
-Howe~ er 9 al ongside the building of an effebtive solidarity movement -to 
aid the Ct1ilean resistance it is th~ duty of revolutionaries to examine 
.. 
and und erstand why Allendets Chilean Road ended in the ~ay i~ did • . --The 
les sons have. to be lear.nt, ~we owe this to th ~. Chilean comrades who were 
slagl1t ered~ h ~~e mu3t be the fullest possible discussion in thq _working 
class mov ement - this is the reas on for w~iting CHILE ~ WHY? 
J . . . 
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Judith Herrison· ·and Maxine Williams. 
September 1'"974 • 
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ORDER OF EVENTS 
1970 
4th September - Allende wins elections but without overall majority 
' (Popular Unity polled 36.3% of the total votes.) 
. , ... 
4th November - Allende officially takes office 9 after the Popular Unity 
coalition has accepted the constitutional guatantees 
demanded by the opposition parties • 
. 
2nd December - First expropriations of big landowners. 
1971 
--
4th April 
11th July 
13th August 
. . 
- Popular Unity wins 49.75% of the votes in the municipal 
elections. 
- Assembly votes unanimously for copper nationalisation. 
- U.S.A. cuts cred·it lines to Chile. 
22nd December - Congress passes constitutional reform limiting the freedom 
of the Government to nationalise. 
1972 
21st August - Start of strikes by shop-keepers 9 and anti-government street 
· demonstrations. 
11th October - Lorrydrivers' strike. 
2nd November - General Carlos Prats 9 Commander-in-Chief of the Army 9 becomes 
Minister of the Interior. 
1973 · 
4th March - Legislative elections. Popular Unity wins 43.9% of votes. 
Considered a success for Allende. 
28th March - The Military leave the government. 
15th May - Miners' strike at El Teniente copper mines. 
28th June - Attack on Presidential palace by armoured tank regiment. 
25th July - Allendo forms a new government 9 which includes 4 members of 
the armed forces; 
4th September - 7 - 800,0JO pooplo demonstrate in Santiago to celebrate the 
3rd anniversary of Allende's Glection as President. 
11th September- The Coup. 
• J •. ~ 
CHILE UNDER THE JUNTA 
i ' 
' . 
.. 
. . . 
· .. 
One of the most tragic experiences in the history of the ~atin American 
working class was the coup ·in Chile on September 11~h •. , 1973. On the side 
of r·· the mil~ tary regime there . ·;·was n~i th er a staunch . b'orgeoi~ie nor popular 
support. There were .only the reqi~emsnts of world · 1mpe~ialism ~ re~dy to 
drown ·in blood . th~ aspirations of the Chilean working ·· class. This. ·is .. n~t ,
1
" _·; 
the first time that ruling circles in Washington ha0e drunk a to~~t ~~ · -
hondur of the ·crushing of the Latin American workers and pe~santso Military 
regimes installed in Brazil, Bolivia and, most recently 9 U~Ggay bear . 
witness to the fragility of the c~pitalist system ~ a rlin~· citass which 
has outlived its historical role becomes a class which is _; forced · to ·resort 
to ·mote .. :.and more. des.perate measures .. ·· in order to maintain its existence. 
. .• 
~ , ' . '· 
The Chii~an jn~a ;has massacred over .50,000 people since the coup.: I.t has 
imprisoned and brutally tortured tens of thousands moro. The jwnta is 
ruling ·; by undisg.uised methods of terroro Yet it is not its own master. In 
spite df the coup, in spite of the unabated level of repression, the junta 
is forced to rely on international capital to bail it out of the enormous 
econ9mic and political crisis which exists in Chile today. The bourgeoisies 
of a11 the countries subject to imperialist domination .are too weak to get 
on with the job of suppressing their own workers and .peasants without 
assistance. They are in no position to compete with t~~ bourgeoisies of 
. ' ' . . North America 9 Western EuropG or Japan for a stake in, .. the exploitatioh of 
the world, and are incapable of freeing their own countries from imperialist 
domination. But so long as the tolonial bourgeoisies fulfil the function of 
providing a suitable 'invostment climate' for foreign capital, they can 
rest assured that a few crumbs will fall on their tables. 
" 
The junta in Chile has opened the doors wide for foreign investors. It has 
denationalised and returned to private ·ownership those· banks and the ind-
ustries which were taken under State control by Allende's Popular Unity 
(U.P.) government. 'Settlements' have been reached with the U.S. companies .. 
which were hit by the nationalisati9n_ of Chile's copper mines in 1971, . 
amounting to vast sums in compensation.· Chile is a member of the 'Andean · 
Peet' - a protective arrangement between 6 Latin American countries, which 
places certain limits over foreign property rights in the member countries. 
. : . 
However, the junta has made clear that it in no way regards this agreement. , 
as binding. Instead, it is offering handsome concessions to investors ~nd 
placing virtually_ no restrictions on their operations. Economic .. prbtection-
ism is hardly a sensible policy for a regime which depends entitely on the 
imperialist power~ for lo6n~, arrn3ments · and trade. And, as the junta has 
realistically pointed out, ·.the . ·Andean ·Pact as a who1e · is f81-iing apart, as 
its member noti6ns increa~ih~l~ realise that even th~ir c~ilective strength · 
is no match for their vastly superior foreign competitors. The junta's move 
has meant that this process of disintegration is speeded up, as foreign 
capital begins to use Chile as a funnel for investing in the other countries. 
The jnta~ then, upholds the principles of free trade, and looks forward to': .. 
developing Chile's economy along similar lines to that of Brazil. In Brazil, 
rich mineral resources attracted billions of dollars in investments, enabling 
some economic growth, bas ed on produstion for export, to take place - the 
so-called Brazilian economic 'miracle'. The Brazilian bourgeoisie· has benef-
ited from th~ investments which have poured into the country, aHd . ha$ been 
furnished with . all the military aid it requires in or.der to play an . effective 
policing rol~ on 'behalf of imperia list interes t s in the whole Latin · American.·. 
continent. The Brazilian workors and peasants have experienced no miraculous 
improvement in their condition of dire poverty, .only an increase in the 
level of repression. The Chilean juntn hopes to receive similarly generous 
treatment from foreign copital. 
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The conditions for a Chilean 'miracle' do not exist. The juhta is too 
unstable, and the advanced capitalist countries are themselves entering 
.. 
. •' 
~ I 
n period of deepening recession. A cutback in world trade immediately hits 
countries dependent " on raw materiel exports for revenue. Brazil h$s already 
been affected, and the fall in world copper prices ~emonstrates that the 
junta's hopes are unlikely to be rea lisedo This is _ not to say that .. foreign 
investo~s are steering ti~~r of Chile • . All the · ma jor ' imperiali~t pow~rs· 
have extended a w~t~ welcome to the new regime, in deed~ if not in wbrds·. 
I • ' • 
. . 
. . . .. 
As . early as .. November · ;1973, the fina_nc~ al Ti_m_C'.? .. s,. · reported that, 
• ' I ' • 
• ! I \ • 
· 'Representatives of the Internationa l Monetary Fund, the World Bank·, 
the Int8r~American Development Bank and the Inter-American Committee 
for the Alliance for Progress aro all to be found in Santiago, 
crowding hotel lobbies and bustling in and out of Ministries.' 
The outcome of all this activity was the granting of long-term loans· ~o the 
junta by all of these agencies. The Financial Times went on to predict 
ez:~--• . - . r .. r ..... ,__.. --- ?* - .., rorr..., .• 
correctly that, 
' ••• unlike last ye ar, 
W2shington's support 
gone conclusion.' 
when the UoSo refused to roll over Chile's debt, 
for the now junta in the Paris Club i s a fore-
The Club of Paris, .which incld~~ the centr~l bankers of 13 imp~rialist 
countriGs, ngreed to exempt the junta from · paym'ent ·of · be two en _ 9~~ and 95% 
of its 1,000 million dollar loan, de ~ in 1973-4~ : for 3 years . Th8 British 
Labour government was party to this agreeme~t. 
Multinational companies from Wo Europe, the u.-s.Ao and Japan a ro ea gerly 
investing in ChilG's mining and manufacturing industries . To cite but a few 
oxamples, Ford Motors ond Dow Ch~micals hav e roturned, aftor having with-
drawn investments during the U.P. years, and British Leyla nd dona ted a 
fl~et of cars to th e junta as n prelude to resuming production in Chile . In 
spite of verbal s upport for Popular Uni~y 9 and condemna tion of the junta , 
Rumania is in on the act too. This 'socialist' country is investing 100 
million dollars in Chilea n mining. 
The Role of tho Junta . 
- - - ,.~~- ·-- t ..... -.-s....-= · ·~· . == ·-·-....-~--
The juntn i s forced to adopt 2 pos ition of s l avish depondonce on . imper~nlism 
by virt~ · of its compl e te isolstion from tho moss of t~e Chilean popula tion. 
It has r apidly . aliennted wh a t Gve r soci2l bas e it onc e had amohgst the 
middle clas s . , This l a yer of s mall s hopkeeper s , professionnls an~ · small and 
. medium s ize entropreneurs wero hit hGrd by infla tion during . the l a~~ yea r s 
of . the Allende regim~. Tho poorer s octions of the middle cl6ss were even 
worse off . than tho working cl2ss , l acking any of th e traditions of organis~ 
ation, or .the protectivo buffer of welfar e pa yments , which thG worke r s had 
won for thems elves ove r many doca des of s truggl e . As s uch, the middle class 
ployed nn important role in bringing down the UoPo gove rnme~t through sabot-
a ge, hoarding a nd "bosses ' s trikes"o This s trRtum t e ndod to . identify with 
the big bourgeois i e , e ven though i t enjoyed f ew of its privil eges, and 
therefore read~ly turn8d to the l a tter' s s ide once it began to experi ence 
mGteria l s uffering unde r the U. P. governmento Howe ver, the juntn has proved 
even l ess copa bl8 of controlling infla tion than All ende 9 and this in s pite 
of the f act tha t i t i s r oc eiving all the nid and encouragGment from the 
imperialis t countries , which was s ys t ema t ic8lly deni od to the Li. Pe govern-
ment. 
Small business es are r apidly going bankrupt, du e to very low wages and . 
nstronomicnl prices . The junta has urged s hopkeeper s to lowe r their prices , 
which for many has 2lrea dy become impossible if they s r e to s urvive . 60% of 
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tho Chilean populntion ecrns less than £15 n month. But prices of all basic . 
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co mm o di ties are nt world lovcls or highoro Tho jn~2 hns deliberately 
lifted nll of the prico controls imposed by tho U.P. govornmcnt, in order · 
to bring the economy 'in line' with the world mark8to Inflation rates which 
were repressed somowhat by Allende's controls, have n~ bocome cle8rly 
visible. The Chilean currency, the EscL1do 9 has been succossivoly devalued, 
pushing the cost of imports - food in particular - up still further. Over-
all inflation rates hove ranched 1,0005~ since the coup. The prices of some 
basic items in ony working class budget went up by the following amounts 
from Soptember 1973, the month of the coup, to June 1974. Gread - from . 11 
to 240 escdos~ Oil - from 45 to 1140 escdos~ Milk - from 7 to· 120 escudos 
and Paraffin ~ from 1 to 70 escudos. 
The minimum monthly wage is officially betweon 30-34,800 escudos. Millions 
earn less than this, and over 20% of the population are un2mployed. Many of 
the unemployed ore workers who have bo8n socked and blacklisted for political 
reasons, and who, · if they have escaped death or imprisonment, are literally 
starving. Virtually all Stato oxpenditure, except on defence, hos beon ·· 
severely cut or stopped - which will mean ~ loss of over one-fifth of the 
jobs in the public sector by 1975. Thus, many'public servants', who pass-
ively or actively supported tho coup 9 are becoming rapidly disencrantod 
with the junta. 
. . 
The junta is living on tic~. ~he creditors of the imperislist countries are 
not philanthropists. Although always willing to bail out reactioh~ry regimes, 
thG banks and 'aid' agencies expect to be paid back sooner or later, 3t 
high interest rates. The junta is borrowing in anticipation of revenue from 
profitable production in the future 9 with which to pay back its loans. In 
the meantime, so3ring interest rates, and the influx of money into the 
economy, which in no way reflocts a real increase in production itself, is .. 
having a drastic inflationary offect. Raising productivity level? is the ·· 
overriding problem for the native bourgeoisies of the underdeveloped 
countries. It is a problem they hRve proved incapable of solving. Each 
step in the direction of indepondont national . developr 'Jnt hes had to be 
made by appoaling to the massos of workers and peasants for support. When 
the mass movemont hss threatened to go too far 1 quasi-indepondent govern-
ments in the Third World hnve found themselves abruptly toppled and replaced 
by military dictatorships • 
... 
· The ~phto of right-wing coups in thG mid-1960s - for oxample in Indonesia, 
Ghana, ·· Algeria and Brazil - testify to this. The high growth rates in Iran, 
Brazil and Indonesia go hand in hand with oxtremely repressive regimes, 
which ensure untroubled waters for foreign investors. Sooner or lnter, 
national bourgoois govornrnents in the Third l0orld, posturing ot times as 
aggressively independent, find themsolves in an impasse between the massos 
in their own countries,and the imperialiBt powors which they ultimatoly 
dopend on. Thus the 'loft-wing' Peruvian governmont was forced last November 
to clamp down severoly on trad2 union unrost, imprisoning large numbers of 
militants. One month later it mode an obout-turn on the nationalisations it 
had made without compensation, and agreed to pay the companios concerned 
what they demanded. 
The position of the junto today, and tho ovents which led up to the coup, 
have been part of this general pattern. The junta is doing its utmost to 
incrense production, but is sovoroly rostricted by virtue of its total 
rolionce on the world marketo The inflationary situotion we have describod 
acts as a disincentive to Chilean investors, given a shrinking home market 
and soaring costs of production. In the short~term, the ropressive regime 
compons2tos for the lack of productivity by forcibly intensifying the 
exploitation of the Chilean workforce. Compulsory unpaid labour of 8 hours 
•. 
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per wook is being enforced upon the workers in the key sectors. Trade 
unions have been made ille921 9 and their leaders and the rank and file 
militants have been killed or incarcerated. The only ;- 'nions~ · allowed at~ 
puppet organisations. set up and manned by the military. Strikes are banned, 
and any sign of protest at the intolerable conditions is summarily put 
, down. The vast pool of unemployed pushos wages and conditions down still 
further than the statutory levol, as workers compete .. for jobs. There · have 
·been -attempted mass exoduses to Argentina, swelling the normal tide of : 
seasonal migrant labourers across the borderG Many have been · turned b~ck -
not surprisingly, givon that a few weeks before his death, the 'populist' 
:· . Peron was having cordial· talks with General Pinochet in Buenos Aires. Those 
who got into Argentina are living in appalling squalor in the shanty-towns. 
Spiits have begun to . emerge within the ranks of the Chilean borg~oisie 
itself~ The· Christian De~ocratic Party and the National: Party, beth active 
·· supporters of the coup, aro now expressing louder and louder dissatisfaction 
with ' the junta's policies. The Edwards family, which has· owned a vast 
percentage_ of Chilean industry for decades 9 is becoming restless at · the 
effects . the present crisis is having 6n its ~rofitability. Both native and 
. ' 
foreign capital would pref8r a ~ctrn to a more 'democratic' form of gov-
ernm~nt, but know that this is out of the question, given th~ need to · 
forcibly hold back the masses by repression. 
Why the Coup? 
·. i 
Tho U~o government was not overthrown by a mass fascist movement. The 
Chilean bourgeoisie and the impeiialist powers fostered the discontent of 
the middle. class and encouraged the g-rowth of f8scist organisations like 
'Patria y Libertad' - F~therland and: Freedomo However, when the strategy of 
undermining ~llende's ~pport through economic sabotage was seon to be too 
ineffectu:al, the al.ternative of a coup was adopted. The U.P. 's programme 
was based upon the conception of gradual reforms, slowly encro8ching upon 
national and foreign owned private property. Allende hoped to win the· · 
allegiance of the middle class, enlarging his electoral majority and there-
by avoiding, at all costs, a civil waro The watchword during the 3 years of 
· the 'Chilean Experiment' was that of unity. In spite of the deepening 
~~ ...... ..._..-.... 
economic crisis, millions of workers and peasants still 16okGd to the 
Popular Unity government for leadership. In the Ma.rch 1973 :elections Popular 
Unity gained ne2rly 44% of the totul voto, compared with 36.3% in 1970. 
Allende had the major~ty of workors and _poasants bohind him~ Tho junta, as we 
have seen, is iso·lated from any ~ocial bnse of support. And yet, th~ Uo~ 
government wos overthrown. 
How 8nd why did the coup tak8 place? given the U.P.'s attempt to unite the 
whole nation b8hind _i t 9 and its declared intGntion of avoiding any unnec-
essary provocation of · the forces of reaction? This is the question which is 
beino nsked with an increasing sense of urgency by workers throughout the 
..J • 
world. If Allende's attempt .to achieve socialism, as the 'first democratic-
ally elected Mar~ist government', has ended in disnster? what does this 
mean for tho international working class movement? Is socialism anything 
more than an idealist's dream? Internotion~l capital hGs demonstrated yet 
again that legality and constitutionalism are merely fncades which it will 
·dispense with rthles~ly wh~never its ovorall strategy of securing continued 
domination over the world's netural resources, the means of production and 
the exploited clas~es is s eriously threatened. 
The parties that claim to · reprosont th-e working clos~ have · r~~pondod loss 
resolutely. Declaration~ of support for Popular Unity, and verb-~l condemn-
ation of the jn~~' ·s ~tr6cities, aro no substitute for concrete aid to the 
Chilean resistance. In Britain, sections of tho l~bor movement ~ notably, 
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AUEW workers at Rolls-Royce in East Kilbride, 2nd the Liverpool dockers -
have given a lead in blacking work on armaments dGstined for use by the 
junta. However 9 this blacking csmpaign has by no means boen unanimous. The 
trade union leaderships havo not initintod a total blocking _mqvement acro?s 
the country, and tho Lcbour Govornment has gone back on its pre-el8ction· 
promises Rbout breaking off all relations with the Junta. It ~~s '.. evon 
repulsod a move on tho part of other EEc -· bo~~trips 9 .with ~ovornmonts that 
do not~clbim ' fo be '~oci~ii~t 1 to como to gn ~ agree~~nt i~ fnvour .6f taking 
in Chil9an refgees.· ~ . ··.: · ··. . . . ·~ . .. ). .. ... ... = 
1 
. . . 
,· . 
. . 
. . -. . 
The samo ntti~Gde : to·le66lity (fh~ san~tit~ -~f the arms · cont~2cis) a~d the 
samo appeal to tho 'national interest i .: (tho balance of payments")' which 
wero repesto_d .pla_intivcly _. by the ·Lio Po gove.rnment ·.:right up :·to :·the · -~ d:3y of the 
coup 9 ars ~:being offqred,: b.Y -.tho ln.b_our leaders. in Britain ris a ju.sti fication 
for not ~o~{ng to t~e def~nce of .the Chilenn workers· ~ Inst~ad ·th~y dall on 
' ·. 
the bourgeoisie itself to restore democracy in Chile. The bourgeoisie dem-
onstrato~ d2ily that it has long outlived the stsgo when it·could ,guarantee 
long periods of.·· s·ustained growth accompanied_· ·by a democratic form of gov_- _;_! .. 
ernment. In Brita-in, _· the activities of .the CBI 2n·d Aims a·f Industry .~!1 · ! ::"~ . 
res pons o tci\ e·ven We dg-ewood Bonn's tim-i d _'mo_vos ·towurds n2 tional~s~_tion 9 \a.nd_ 
the· exi.:Jtence. of po.rnmili tnry group·s which ha_vo declared themselves ready~: . 
to h~lp rGstor~ law and cirdor in the ev~nt o~· 2 Gonornl S~rike - these and ... 
. . . 
othor ea~ples are· concrote evidence of wh?t the response of the. British 
.... • . J: 4 
ruling class wi~_l bo to 2ny threat to the.ir _prerog0tive to rul:?:•.- -
.. . 
. . . 
Today, more thah ~ n-ver 9 we must givo an honest accoljnt.i~g pf .. ~-h~ event~ in 
Chile-, nnd le0rn from the lossons of that· "exporio()ce, ·if .. we . a.re to avoid 
yet another · 'ChilGnn Exporiment' - ar) · experiment· mndc at the expense of the 
working class~ and go .forward to a victorious socialist rEvolution • 
.. 
~ . 
. . 
. .. 
~ l • 
: ~ .. . 
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. 
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·- . 
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THE RISE OF POPULAR -UNITY 
What was 'Popular .Unity', and how did it succeed in t aking office in Sept- : 
ember 1970? The UoP• ·government, headed by President Sa lvador Allende, 
consist8d of · an ·electoral bloc comprising the two mass workers' partios~ ~ 
the Communist Party and · the Socialist arty~ the Radical Party, represent- ;_· 
ing the rniddlo class, and five liberal splinter parties. AllendG· made clear 
that Popular ·Unity hoped to be all things to all meng 
'The programme of Popula r Unity is not a Communist programm8, nor is 
.it $ Socialist programme , nor a Radical programme, nor the programme 
of the MAPU ., or the API. It is the convergence of opinion.~ 
(New York Times, October 4th., 1970.) 
Such a collection of strange bed-f~llows was by no moans unique in the 
history of · Chilesn politics. Thete had boen o whole succession of ·!Popular.· 
Front' governments iM tho p~~t·, starting with the Communist Party/Socialist 
Party/Radical Party government of 1938-41, under a Radical Party resident~ 
Pedro Aguirre Cerda. It . came into office at a tim8 of deep socinl crisis, 
when Chile was suffering tho offects of the 1930's depression~ Working · · 
class militancy was on tho as cendant, highlighted by the railroad workers' 
strike· in 1936, which wa~ crushed by the government forces. This first 
Popular Front set a precedent for the ones which were to follow in future 
decades. Whilst Chile has few features which mako it in any way an except-
ion to tho general characteristics of other underdeveloped countries, its 
succGssion of Popular Front governments i s unique in the experience of 
............ 
Latin American countries. 
Chile's much-vaunted 'democratic traditions' ha ve been put to the test 
before. Though tho Chilean a rmy h8 s not staged coups in the manner of most 
of the Latin American military, it ha s frequently bean used, like all 
capitalist a rmies , to ruthlossly put down r evolt on the part of the exploit-
ed classes. 2 9 000 s triking workers were shot down by the a rmy in the 
infamous mass acre of 1907, a t the Santa Maria de Iquiqu e nitra te mines. 
3,000 s nltpe tre miners ws r e killod when the a rmy movod in on their s trike 
in 1925 - the same yea r tha t tho Cons titution which the Popular Unity 
government nbided by, wos writts no These bloody and unwritten pages in 
Chileun his tory ha v8 been r e poa t ed over decades. As r ecently as the 1960' s , 
miners, industria l worker s and s qu a tte rs wer e s hot down in a series of 
s trikes and l and occpa tions ~ 
Chile, then, hes 2 long und bitter his tory of class s truggle , expres s ing 
tho inability of the nntive bourgeois i e to sn tis fy even the mos t minima l 
demands of the workor s and pe3sants 7 and its noG d t o r esort to naked forc e 
in order to maintain its rulo. Tho working class e verywher e responds to 
a ttacks on its conditions of life , caused by the anarchy of cris is-ridden 
copitali s t production, by t oking collective , de f ens ive mensures whe r e it 
i s sufficiently s trong and wellcuorgonised. In the countries domin nt od by 
imperi alis m, the working masses confront not only t heir own bourgeois i es 
as clsss enemies , but a l s o the infinite ly grea t or powe r of foreign c apital. 
Imperia lis m do Gs not only di s tort and hold back the de ve lopment of the 
na tiona l economies it exploits - it a l s o creates 2 whole new se t of social 
rolotions be tween the clossos ins ide t hose countries . 
Chile has s uffer ed all tho us uAl Gff ects of imperialis t domina tion. Copper, 
potenti2lly an enormous source of wenlth for dive r s ifying and indus trial-
i s ing the economy, has long been ' expro pri2t ad' by f or eign inves t or s . Up 
until 1966, when th8 fir s t coppe r notionalisations by a Chilean government 
took place , tho U.S.A. nl one owned 7 8~ of the country' s coppe r production. 
Coppe r accounts for ove r 60% of Chile ' s exports . Out of the tota l e>~ ports 9 
80% i s made up by mine r a l s of vnrious kinds . Agriculturo has a lwa ys been 
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concentrated in a few hands. The landowners have not modernised their 
plantations, preferring simply to exploit the cheap labour and keep prod-
uction at a very low level. Although the land is capable of feeding a 
population twice the size ~f Chile's, the present state of agriculture means 
that Chile imports over 20~{1 of her foodstuffso The econc .ny as a whole is 
stagnant.Other than during the first year of Allendevs government, when ind-
ustrial production rose by between 9% to 10% 9 growth levels have usually 
.been well below 1%. Unemployment and underemployment have consequently been 
very high. Chile is the world's second most indebted nation next to Israel. 
Over 35% of its export capacity goes towards servicing its foreign debt. 
For riation~ dominated by the Western capitalist countries, there is no smooth 
road to industrial development. In the underdeveloped countries, it is not 
just a question oF repeating the process that the 'metropolitan' nations 
underwent more than a century ago. The development of capitalism in Europe 
and America has led to the subordination of the rest of the world to these 
economies. Driven on by its superior forces of production, the West has 
introduced elements of its techniques into the Third World. The introduction 
of capitalist goods and machines in a selective manner did not lead to the 
development of capitalism in the backward nationso Rather, advanced capitalist 
techniques exist alongside feudal and semi-feudal forms of production, 
subjecting the peoples of Latin America, Africa and Asia to the interests of 
imperialism. The deformation inflicted on these countries gives rise to 
peculiar class relations 9 very different from those in the West. Typically, 
Third World cr.untries have a large peasant population and a small, relative-
-ly weak, proletariat. The colonial bourgeoisie does not have the strength of 
its counterpart in the advanced capitalist nations. It is too closely tied to 
imperialism to wage a resolute stru·ggle for economic independence· ~ · 
This is not to say that sections of the national bourgeoisies do not attempt 
to attain some degree of independence at times, in cirder to be able to ·exploit 
'their own' workers and peasants uninterruptedly. Thus, they sporadically 
attempt to rally the workers behind them under the banner of a nationalist 
movement. Such movements are undoubtedly progressive, when taken up by the 
working class in the oppressed nationso They express a desire to be rid, once 
and for all 1 of the foreign powers who ·are blocking the path of ind~g·enos 
development. A.t certain times the native bourgeoisie is even able to deliver 
the goods, and consolidate mass support. In Argentina, Chile's next-door-
neighbour, Peron succeeded in developing the Argontinian economy, and granting 
substantial concessions to .the workers 9 for a limited period of time. This 
was thanks to the economic dislocation created during and after the second 
World· War 9 which gave Argentina a temporary advantage on the ~orld market&> 
The Argentinian workers. remember this achievement 7 and identify it still with 
Perono - 'P oronism ' i ~-j still the symbol of the popular movement, in spite of 
the fact that any hope of a long~term development of the economy, with 
concommitant benefits for tho working class 9 has long s ince proved tq be .a 
myth. The Argentinian economy today faces soaring ' inflation, and is in recession. 
Peron, during his fi~al term of office 1 cracked down severely on the Lefto 
The colonial bourgeoisies always play a vacillating role, coming down on the 
side of their masters whe_n they feel that the masses are g.oing 'too far'.- · 
Class St~ggle and Class Collaboration 
· ·-- - ................. ,.. - ·-~... ••es-.._ +-u:.e-: - . ..... _.. - -~---~~ - · ..• , ............. _~~ .... 
The class struggle in Chile has followed this same course. What has been 
peculiar to the Chilean oxperience is the role that the workers' organisations 
have playr:d in the tortuous zigzags. Chile has a larger proletariat and a 
smaller peasantry than most Third World countrieso Tho proletariat first 
developod around the mining indus tries . Although small numerically, they have 
had a major impact on the wholo development of the labour movement in Chile. 
Rapidly creating their own tr8de union organisations , the mineworkers soon 
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extended their methods of struggle to workers in nearby areas and in 
industries r~lated to mining. The first national confederation of trade 
unions wa~ set up in 19090 Under the impact of the Russian Revolution of 
1917 9 t .his· body moved leftwards and gained wide support - particularly· in the 
port of Valparaiso ·9 the coal mines of Lota 9 t_he nitrate mine:> of the North 9 · 
and in Santiago. The labour force rapidly expanded in ·the years betwaen the 
wnrs .o The growth of ·the ·blue-collar work force slacked off in the 1950 's and .__ 
1960 1 s 9 'but a large increase in state spending created a lot of new jobs in 
th~ publiQ sectqro The proportion of ~orkers in the service industries as 
compared with -those in the productive industries has steadily increasedo 
Meanwhilc 9 the peasant population has continued to decline in relativ2 termso 
What has this meant politically for the Chilean workers? Firstly 9 ~ apace with 
the growtn of E moro 1modorn' working class 9 there . developed a more homogenous 
ruling class._ After a period of initial _rivalry between the industrial 
borgeoisie~ who advocated free trade 9 and the lando0ners 9 who wanted a 
protectionist system 9 interests rapidly mergedo By the 1920 1 s 9 iandowners 9 
mineowners~ export and import merchants 9 light consumer industrialists and 
financiers had either amalgamated? inter-married or diversified their economic 
interests to a point where there wns a g~neral assimilation · of the competing 
ruling tlass fr~ctions. :The bourgeoisie as a whole became -firmly tied to the -
imperialist · intorests in Chile - first of all Britainy and then predominantly 
the U.SeAo The old political parties of the landed oligarchy gradually gave 
way .to the _ parties of the modern bourgeoisie - the National Party 9 the Christian 
Democratic Party .and the Radical Party. 
. ' . 
Secondly 9 t~e g~owing labour movement developed its own political expression 9 
primarily in the Socialist and Communist Parties of Chile, completing the 
class polarisation on the political arenao In 1912 9 Luis Emilio Recabarren 7 
head of the first Chilean trade union confederation 9 founded the ~workers' 
Socialist Party'' (WSP). In 1922 9 the W.SoPo joined the Third International 
and became the Communist Party of Chile. A section of the WoSoPo opposed this 
move 9 and in 1933 was to form 9 along with a number of smaller organisations 
otsi~e the Communist Party 9 the Socialist Party of Chileo Today 9 the Chilean 
Socialis~- Party is the only one in Latin America with any mass supporto In 
spi.te of the difforences between the Socialist and Communist Parties 9 nnd their 
rivalry for hegemony over the trade union movemant 9 they have pursued very 
. similar policios over the decades o They have both adopted a strategy of al_lying 
with the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties in ~Jplar Front governments 9 in 
the hope of cnrrying out major reforms through parliamentary legislation and 
achieving a greater measure of national independence. 
Such alliances on tho part of the bourgeoisie in Chile 9 as in Spain and France 
in the 1930'_s 9 and as in Portugal today 9 hav3 nevGr been agreed to as a matter 
of preferenc~o Rather 9 tho bourgeoisie is .forced at certain times 9 under prossure 
from the mass movoment which thoy regard as rising to a dangerously militant 
level 9 to seek assistancG in quelling this tide from the leaders qf the ·workers' 
organisationso The 'Social Compact' of the British Labour Governme~t 9 which has 
bee~ swallowed -by most of the trade union leaders 9 is but one way in which the 
bourgeoisie is Gttompting to rostrain militancy through a 'voluntary ' agreo-
ment with those leaders who a large section of British workers look too In 
Chile? the SociEllist Party and Communist Party· bore thEJ alle-gian.ce .o.f mill.ions 
of workers. The Communist Party is the dominant force in the CoUoT. ( the 
·Chilean ToU.Co)o As such 9 the policios they have pursuod havo been decisive in 
dGtermining which way the workers and poasants have movud politicallye 
Under successive Popular Front governments some . minor _ reforms wero achieved o 
. . ; 
h~se reforms 9 however~ in no W8Y matchod up to ~he promise~ of the election 
manifestoes~ and the borgooisi~ was always ready to get rid of its unsavoury 
partners whenever the opportunity arose o At the height of the 'C old War' 9 in 
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1947, President Videla., . head · of 1 the second 7Popular Front government, ousted 
·!l 
the Communist Party members from his Cabinet and then passed a law banning the 
c.P. altogether.This had a very debilitating effect: on the labour movement, 
but fo·r ·. most workers the treatment they saw their. representatives receive at 
the hands of the bourgeoisie served to strens 1.. ien, rather than· .. ~ eaken, their 
loyalty to them. Support for Socialist and Commr;~st candidates,·,1hqwever, has 
:a by no moans been constant. The large middle class,. the peas r: . . ti;y ~nd sections 
of the working class have fr~qently put candidates f~om the bourgeois parties 
into office, attracted by thei_r · demagogic 'nation:8iist' and 'popu.list' platforms. 
. : 1 .. . . •. .•· • ~· 
The mi. ddl~ class has rriCJriy '"_a time swung the balance'·- in elections, __ ideologically 
identt .. fying with big buslness. 
-~ 
The 1970 Eleritf6ris .. . · . . I .. .. ;. .. 
. .. 
. . 
Electoral battles are never .merely a matter of pailiamentary point-scoring. 
Allende's victory in September, 1970, .reflected the real .dynamics of the 
class strugg·le -in Chile~ · By the· late 1960' s, the workers ar~d peasants had 
become increas.ingiy disillusioned and embittered by the fa1led prorhis'es of ·-
. • I • . • , 
successive governments, cl:'lf!l_i-n'ating in that of Eduardo Frei 1 s Christian ._,. __ 
Democratic a~ty. A mounting w~~e of strikes and seizures df land, · ~thlessly 
put down by the 'Carnbineros' ~ - the paramilitary police . force - demonstra~ed 
the workers' insistence for something better than Frei's ~liberal' economic 
. . 
policies. The peasantry in particular made determined strides \forward during 
thGse years, peasant unions growing from a few thousand -rii~r.t h:::-s. i f! ·. 9 :5 4, to 
. . 
1001 000 members in 1969. Under the Christian Democrats, fore'ign investment was 
wholeheartedly encouraged, inflation spiralled as the national debt mounted up, 
and half-hearted moves towards agrarian reform and coppe·r ·nationalisation 
failed to improve the conditions of the working people _in any way. 
In ·1957, the 'Popular Action front' (FRAP) was formed, unifying the Socialist 
Party and Communist Party, after the ban on the latter was lifted, and a number 
of smaller left-wing and liberal parties. Allonde had stood as the FRAP'S 
candidate in the 1964 Presidential elections, but was d3feated by Frei, who at 
that time had ·most of th8 bourgeoisie united behind him. It was FRAP which 
later evolved into 'Popular Unity', by joining ~ith the Radical Party to wage 
tho 1970 election campaign. The programme of FRAP and the Popular Unity programme 
wore very similar - a series of minimum reforms, including nationalisations 
and land reform. 
The upsurge in militancy during the Frei years, which helped to oust him from 
office, happened in spite of, rather than because of, the Socialist Party's and 
Communist Party's lendership. The Communist Party, in particular, adopted a 
very conciliatory nttitud8 towards the Christian Democratic government. The 
Chilean C.P. echoed official Soviet policy, which disclaimed any responsibility 
for Chile's 'labour troubles'. Thus,in March 1966, whon police killed seven 
miners,and injured twenty five, a t thG El Teniente mines, and when the Carabineros 
occupied the Anaconda mines to break a sympathy strike, an article in ~ 
complained, 
'The reactionary press and radio in C ~ J le 1 in justifying the reprisals, 
turns to the most ridiculous falsehoods. Such 2s, for example, that 
it is possible to find reference to the connection alleged to exist 
between thG strikes in the copper mines and the decisions of the Havana 
Conference of the Solidarity of the Peoples of the Three Continents ••• 
All these false arguments have only one aim - to l~y a smoke-scroen of 
a slanderous campaign against tho progressive forces, and to try to lay 
the blame on them for the sad events ••• ThGse tragic events have 
deepened the ~r~Gis which the Christian Democrat Party of Chile is 
undergoing ••• Chile's true friends cannot but regret the situation 
which is coming about in the country. They were pleased from the bottom 
., 
. , 0 
\ 
J 
I 
'of their hearts at the prospects which were opened up by the reforms 
proposed by the Frei government and rejoiced at Chile's independ ent 
foreign policy. The efforts of reactionary forces to deflect Chile 
from thc3e policies cannot but harm the national interests of the 
country.' (Pravda, March 17th 9 1966) 
For the USSR~ Chile's 'independent foreign policy' meant the possibility of 
trade with the Frei government 9 and the Chilean Communist Party therefore 
attempted to hold bock the mass movement which threatened to jeopardise these 
cordial ralations. When this proved impossible 9 and when circumstances 
militated in favour of a victory for a new Popular Front government~ the 
Communist Party became the most ardent supporter of Allende 9 and from that 
time onwards defended Popular Unity against all comers. 
One of the factors which 9 added to the discontent of the masses~ enabled the 
Popular Unity coalition to win the 1970 elections, was a split in the bourgeois 
camp itself. The ruling class was divided over which solution was required 
for the deep problems facing the Chilean economy. This split emerged in the 
rival candidacies of Jorge Alessandri (National Party) and Radomiro Tamie 
(Christian Democrat). The former campaigned on an openly anti-communist, 
patriotic ticket, whilst the latter 9 more subtlyg put forward a programme of 
reform d~signed to appeal to the middle class and peasantry. At times Allende's 
and Tomic 1s programmes appeared indistinguishable. The final result was that 
no one candidate won an overall majority in the 1970 election, although 
Allende polled the highest overall vote. 
Sections of the bourgeoisie were willing to go along with Popular Unity, 
watching to see how far Allende would dare go and how far the Chilean workers 
would try to push him. Above all, native and foreign capital were concerned 
to ensure that the UeP• government's reforms would not overstep the boundaries 
of the capitalist state, and that its repressive apparatus would remain 
intact in order to be brought into operation for the inevitable task of 
holding back the mass movement. 
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To this end, th8 bourgeois opposition p8rties, lod by the Christian Democrats, 
dGman9o.d tha=t the UP bloc should accept far-reaching cc '1 sti tutional 
conditions before they would be allowed to take office 9 as a 'minority 
govornment 9 , These conditions wero as fol~ows~ no changes were to be made in 
thu size of the armed forces~ no 1 privato' militias WGro to be allowod~ no 
military -officers were to bo appointed who had not attGndGd the ruling class 
academies~ the government wns not to tamper with the Church, tho Judiciary, 
tho press and othc~ m?ss media, the schools or tho unions. · .. , . 
. . 
Chilo has ono of th8 largest 2rmed forces of any South American country, in 
relation to the size of its populntion. The army is approximately 75,000 
strong. The Carabineros hove 25,000 mon. No other Latin American country, 
oxcGpt for ~razi~, hns recoived more military aid from the U.S.A. Thousands 
of thG·Chiloan military hsve receivGd treining in North America. We have seen 
the role the army and police heve played throgh~t modorn Chilean history. 
Yot, Allondo was 8ble to say of the armod forces, in 1971, 
'I hnvo absolute confidenco in thoir loyalty. Our forcos are professional 
forces 2t the service of the state 9 of. the people' ( New York Tim Gs , 2 8 th r·1 arch , 1 9 71 ) :. 
Tho Goneral Secretary of the Chilean Communist Party, Luis Corvalan, wns to 
. I 
reaffirm this faith in tho willingnoss of the troops to servG the psople, as 
late in tho day as July 8th, 1973 9 
'\ . . . .. ~ 
'Some reactionarios ~Rvo begun to seek now ways to drive a wedge between 
tho people and the armod forcGs 7 maintaining littlo less than we aro 
inteoding to replace the.professional army. No 9 sirs! We continue to 
· support tho 0bsolutely profcssion2l character of the armed institutions. 
Their enemios ~re not amongst tho ranks of tho pooplo but in the 
. re o. c ti on a r y camp • ' · ( f-1 or xis m To day 9 Sep t ember , 1 9 7 3 ) 
In a r~ce~t article by ~ - mo~ber . of tho Oritish Communist Party, nconditi~nally 
defending the stratogy pursued by t~o U.Po government, uhc consequencos of 
not ' _tnmpe~ing; with ~he mass media or tho judiciary are .succinctly spelt out_, , 
'With the particulB.r characteristics of tho "constitutional rand'·' it was 
·~ virtally impossible for Populnr Unity to do anything to curb the right~ 
~wing moss media ••• since tho judiciary is a soporato power in the 
Chilean state system, and the judicial authorities were against the 
govornment, what the President could do wns minimnl and quite ineffective 
in practice. It would havo needod 2 law to reduco the power of the 
right-wing press~ but this was impossible bocausG Popular Unity did not 
enjoy a pnrliamontary mojorityn (Comment, 1st June, 1974) · 
I • 
At the time; howover, the demands for constitutional guarnnte8s arousod a 
storm of ~ndignont protests from Allondo 2nd from tho Communist Party, who 
declared that they would novcr accept such crippling conditions. N8vertheless, 
within two weeks the U.P. coalition proved in pr0ctice how highly it valued 
parliamenta~y rules, ·by accepting ~very one of tho opposition's demands. 
Rathor than rely on the millions of ·workors who had voted for them,- rather 
than calling on the Chilean masses to demolish the parlisment2ry opposition, 
tho Li .P • leaders pref8.r.r.ed to aces pt compromises which made a mockory of 
their programme of reforms. Even the limited inro8ds which they had promisGd 
to m?ke ~nt~ · t~e power of n2tivo 8nd foreign c2pitnl, would inevitnbly bring 
roprisals =which could ohly be countered by tho organised strength of the · · 
wo~ki~g class. By ref0sing . to tamper with the capitalists' state apparatJs :-
- its ·1aw courts, its pross, its army - the Populnr Unity government was 
effectively saying that it hopod to come ·to some nmicoble 8Qr8ement with tho 
capitalist class as to how bost it could hand over its proporty to tho working 
class. 
The Chilean MiracJP? 
.__.., · -
For one year 9 it looked as though just such a miracle was indaed possible. 
The 'first democratically elected marxist government' carried through a 
series of reforms which materially benefitted the Chilean working class 
beyond a doubt. Wages went WP by as much as 50% 9 while strict prioe controls 
reduced the rate of inflation. Thus real wages were increased considerably 9 
and were supplemented by free distribution of a few goods and services -
- for · exarnple 9 free milk to low income groupse The unemployment level fell 
from 6.1% in 1970~ to 4.2% in 19710 Public sector housing increased by 360% 
from ~ September 1970 to August 1971 9 as compared with a similar period a year 
before. 60% of the banks and insurance companies . were brought under state 
control. The land reform programme 9 commenced under Frei 1s government 9 was 
speeded·up. As promised 9 the 49% of Chilean copper mines which remained to 
be nationalised were taken over. 
These rneasures 9 and others 9 won Allende an enlarged elactora~· victory in the 
1971 municipal elections 9 and ensured popular support for more far-reaching 
reforms. The national mood was one of euphoria 9 in which it was believed 
that anything was now posaibleo The Popular Unity government had unleashed a 
tremendous force - the energy and aspirations of the Chilean working classo 
But 9 tied hand and foot to the bourgeois state 9 the UoPo could only hope to justify its existence by restraining the mass movement to a level toerable 
to the capitalist classo In an epoch when all the tendencies drive towards 
socialism - or barbarism - the U.P. reformists wished to prove to the 
ruling class that it did not really need to turn to military methods of 
government. Above all~ the Popular Unity government wanted to avoid civil w~r~ 
'Always we havG maintained - and we repeat it today on the weight of 
recent successes ~ that in the conditions existing in Chile there is 
a real possibility to complete the anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchica 
revoltion~ and march forward to Socialism 9 without civil war 9 although 9 
naturally 9 maintaining an intense class $truggle' {Luis Corvalan 9 op. ci 
The programme of Popular Unity was fraught with contradictions which could not 
be resolved in favour of the Chilean masses. The Bolivian experience 9 with 
the army's ousting of Torres 9 had recently demonstrated what happens to a · 
populist leader 9 and the movement he embraces 9 when he attempts to climb on 
the shoulders of the capitalist state and command his troops from those 
precarious heights. Allende 1gnored this and numerous other examples of the 
fatal results of relying on the supposed neutrality of the state 9 and its 
coercive apparatus. But the contradictions in the UePo 1s strategy went deeper 
still • . 
• I 
The very programme they held to 9 representing as it did an amalgam of all the 
conflicting interests contained in the Popular Unity coalition 1 was in no way 
designed to mobilise the masses for the revolutionary overthrow of the 
capitalist order. Allende hoped to create a truly 'mixed e~onomy 1 9 with a 
socially owned 9 a privately owned and a mixed sector. Chile already had one 
of the highest levels of stato intervention in Latin Amorica. Increasingly 9 
capitalist development has required that the state plays an ever greater 
role in initiating and ensuring national capital accumulation. In the 
imperialist epoch 9 the domination of the world market ·by the advanced capital-
ist countries has nocessitated a lovol of productivity 9 a scale of production 9 
and the provision of an infrastructure 9 which only the state in the Third f 
World can even attempt to achievoo For this reason 9 the national bourgeoisie (' 
attempts to use the state in Third World countries 9 both to initiate its 
own investments and to nationalise foreign investments - particularly in 
'basic' sectors of the economy 0 The colonial bourgeoisie hopes 9 in this way 9 
to achieve a level of productivity which is sffici~ntly high to s.urvive world 
competition 9 and therefore to provide the basis for . its own . acbumulation of 
capitalo 
-12-
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Where are the resources to come frorn 9 for c.arr:ying .out this project? .Third 
World countries hope to utilise the revenue ·anticipated from sales of their 
. . 
raw materials on the world marketo Allonde ·was to rely on 'expected' copper 
revenues to carry out his programmo. The other nlternative 9 as in 8razil 9 is 
massive foreign investment and super-exploitation of the working classo; In 
all cnses 9 vast amounts of capital have to bG borrowed from the international 
financial institutions. The underdGvoloped country is therefore doubly reliant 
on the world ecohomy; oh selling raw materials at prices detorrn~ned by the 
world commod1ty markots ~and on interest rates determined by the w·orld fina.ncial 
markets. The vast naticinal debts and galloping inflation rate~ cha~acteristic 
of Latin American oconomios are the outcome of thG failure of this strategy 
of indigenous capit~list developmento The state 9 · in the Third World countries 9 
inevitably becomes an instrurnent· ·of foreign capital domination. Allende 1 s 
'Chilean Road' turned out to be no exception • 
.. 
The imperialist powers are not averse to restricted nationalisation measures 
being car'r ied ·out by Third War ld governments sinco, a ft er all 9 they amount 
to an economic infrastructure being paid for by the countries they are 
exploiting. Foreign capital has 9 over recent years 9 increasingly shiftod into 
the more profitable manufactu'ring sectors in the underdevelopod countriGs 9 
utilising modern techniques but with the enormous advantage of a very cheap 7 
and usually poorly organisod 9 labour force. Allende 9 however 9 v~liontly 
hoped to transform the Chilean state into something other than what it had 
!always beeno He hoped to uso the stato to croate a more egalitarian nation 9 
and to build up industry and agriculture to a point where Chile could be 
independent of her imperialist mastGrs. 
A .• Vt.op ian . .P. r.o gramme. 
Thus 9 his first reforms were dir8ctGd towards redistributing incomo in favo~ 
of the poor 9 and taking ova~ the major oconomic asset of the bountry - copper. 
Industrial production· taken ovGrall increased considerably from 1970 to 1971 9 
but · most of ·these · increases came from those industrios producing consumer 
c ·-good~. This was hardly surprising 9 giv6n the additional spending power of the 
Chilean workors thanks to their increased wages. Copper production increased 
somewhat - by about 4% in 1971. But this was far less than had boen e~pected 9 
and was to create onorrnous problems for the government, 
It had been hoped that tho necessary revenue _ for wage incroases 9 i~pro~ements 
in the social services and expansion of tho stato sector~ would come ih the 
first place from the nationalised copper industry. The idea was that the 
increased purchasing powor this would create would act as an incentivo to the 
rest of industryo What was lacking from this perspective was any re~ognition 
of the.need for centralised planning of tho wholo economy 9 as the _ only means 
by which ·Chile could cease to be entirely subjoct to the whims and · dictates 
of the imperialist - powerso 'Plnnningt cannot bo introduced piecemeal into the 
wapitalist system. Cnpitalism is an anarchic modo of production 9 based on ' the 
drive to accmGla~e ever more capital and 9 therefore 9 on the · competitive 'laws 
of the mark~t'o An economy can · only be planned by and ~ for the working claSS9 
onco it has ov~rthrown the cap1talist class, expropriated its property in the 
means of prodc~ion 9 and abolishe~ its stateo 
The Popular Unity government failed 9 or refused 9 to recognise this reality 
but WGre nevertholess confronted daily with its results. The copper industry 
was subjoct to a fall in world prices from about 66.52 cents .por pou1d ·in 
1970~ to 49 cants p~r pound in 1971. This was due to both a 'normal' 
fluctuation on the world m2rket~ and a concerted ~ffort on the part of ono 
of th~ nati~nalised UoS.A. copper companies~- Kennecott 9 to push the pri~e ?f Chilean copper down. In addition 9 costs of production in the mines 
increased by 84 million dollars 9 thanks t6 ;·~he s~ate . they had beon·left in 
by the ~orth ' American compahi~s whon they - de~art~d fhe lack of techniqians 
and the ·increased wage bill fc1r the min.ers·. Thos G ~ere ali foresoeablG ' 
problems, yet tho Popular Unity government ploddod on regardless 9 trying .to 
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juggle fisca nnd financial policies to make up for the deficit in revenuo. 
Givan that h~~endo had 2greed to honour tho 2 billion dollar Chilean debt, 
owed almost entirely to the U.SoA., this was to prove a truly Herculean tasko 
No single nation can escape from the domination of the world oconomy. Even 
Britain, an infinitoly more advanced capitalist country than Chile, and ono 
of the imperialist powors which has helped to doform the economios of tho 
Third World countries, daily suffers the offects of fluctuations on tho world 
market. Risos in pricos of raw mat8rials 9 or reducod orders for exports, wreak 
havoc on the British ~ ~~ c~ : ·, Tho Energy Crisis strikingly demonstrates 
the power of tho world oconomy over oach nation-state. Further, once a world 
division of labour h2s beon created, tho most advanced tochniquos ponotrating 
to all corners of thu oarth 9 no ono nation can freo itself from tho imporialis 
stranglehold simply by making grand 'socialist' gestures - like nationalisatio 
- without regard as to how n nationalised sector will rolnte to the rest of 
the economy, nnd how the necessary tochnical exportise will be acquired to 
run the industry. Socialism, in the twontioth contury 9 is n~t n ~opinn dream. 
Tho forces of production havo dovoloped to 8 point where nll tho prerequisites 
exist for n socialist plonned economy. Tho c~pitalist mode ~f production is 
the obstacle to nny further dovolopment of these productive forceso At every 
point, the capitolist systom blocks the courso of progress for the wholo of 
humanity, ond only succeeds in temporarily dovoloping new technology and 
stabilising growth in periods following on crises and wars~ when rnon, raw 
materials and machinery have b c ~·n plhysically destroyed in vast quantities. 
It is one thing to recognise the 'irrationality' of tho capitalist system. It 
is quite another thing to achieve a successful revolution and set about ·· - -· 
building socialismo The advanced capitalist nations have attained a high level 
of productivity, which must be rapidly matched and surpassed by any country 
attempting to carry through the transition to socialism. If this task is not 
accomplished - if even the elementary steps towards accomplishing it are not 
taken - then superior technology and cheap goods become tho greatest w~apon 
international capitalism possesses for dostroying tho economy of a workers' 
stateo For the backward . natio~s tho problEms are enorm - ·Js~ Howover 9 given that 
there is no 2..?£it~l~t road to development in tho Third World 9 and given that 
the exploited classes bf these countries cannot 'wait' until revolutions in 
the West liborate them from stagna~ion ~n ~ backwardness 9 there is only one 
possible course of action to chooseo Tho proletariat and peasantry of the 
oppressed nations have no alternative but to embark on the course of socialist 
dovelopment 9 by making a revolutionary break with the capitAlist ordoro 
How is this to be ach~Gved? The UoPo governmont 9 s strntegy was utopian 9 and 
therefore incapable of furthoring tho interests of the working classo Ignoring 
all tho most pressing tasks facing tho Chilean economy 9 Popular Unity attempte 
to create 'enclaves' of socialism in a country still controlled in its entiret 
by native and foreign capital. The UePo loadors urged the workers to wage a 
'battle for production', but resisted all moves by the producers themselves 
to exercise control over tho farms 9 the factorios, the mines or the distributi 
network. This attempt to roll history backwards 9 to act as if imperialism did 
not exist, and as if socialism could be 2chievod through utilising tho law-book 
of parliament8ry democracy 9 provsd disastrous in its consequenceso . 
Economics and Politics _______,........_,__,.,..., __ <:'_' ----
What was required was a whole series of practical measures dosigned to lay 
the basis for a planned economy, protect the gains made against the ravages of 
imperialism~ and politically win thG mass es to the side of socialist 
revolution. The faith which the Chilean workers expressed in Allonde, and 
their spontaneous moves in the direction of socialism 9 by no moans amounted 
to their having arrived at a point where they saw the necessity to seize 
. ' 
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state power ·and overthrow the capitalist class. On the ~ontrary, thoir 
allegiance to ~oplar Unity acted as an enormous . obstaclu . to the growth of 
8 truly revolutionary mass movement. 
,_ 
A case in point is th2t of the · capper miners, who, 2s WG have seen , were a 
traditionally militant sector. The U.P.'s first year of incoms redistribution 
was no ~olt{bn to th~ long-term problom of raisin~ productivity, and 
diversifying the · .Gcono-my. As Chile became more and more the object of direct 
sabotage by the impGrialist pow·er :s, and as na,.ti ve capitalists refused to bo 
induced to invest, but inste2d· either fled the country or stayed to wreck it, 
Popular Unity found it2clf with a situetion of 8conomic chaos nnd soaring 
inflation on its hands. Tho 'El Teniante' copper minGrs struck for higher 
wages in Mny 1973. Allcndo hnd received his highest percentage of vot8s . from 
the mining areas - about 40% higher than tho national avorag8o. But the U.P • 
governmont's treatmont of this strike and, more importantly, its · f~ilres in 
rela~ion to tho miriing· iMdustry long before the strike took place, transformed 
the minework8rs into an instrument of the bourgeoisie. 
There was a real neciessity far the miners to exercise control over the 
production process. One of the first problems facing the nationalised copper 
industry, .. wns the ·- damage which ·had been d:on~o~ to :_t_he mine faces by the 
North Amorican copper ~companiGs. Therefore, at one mine, productive output 
increase~ during ·the ·Allonde years, ·but, 
I o • • t 
'·~· a lo~ nf this offort ~ent _ ~nto removing the ballast l8ft in plac~ 
by t~e former mining comp~ny which had attempted to oxtract as much 
miner~i as possib1o befo~ci finally b8ing taken over 1 ~nd had worked an 
the faces whero the minetal ·- content was high an~ easily extractable ••• 
the pre-nationalisation oploit~tion policy ••• involved the new 
'"·a·dminis tr2 ti on in a : tremendous effort to remove large quaf)ti ties of 
rubble befcire oxtractirig -Oro' 
.... (J.A. Zammit, The Chilean Road to Socialism, pp. 153-.6) 
This .was a clc:Jar example of sabotage of production by the C[\pi talist class. 
Popular Unity should hsve called on the mineworkers to exercise control in 
order to snfeguard production. There was a visible material necessity for 
such control. Such a vit81 first stop,would h8ve led the miners in o direction 
which would make them want to defond ~0GrY blow struck ot the capitalists as 
m gDin for .tho whole working ·clo.s?• · .. 
-· . 
But, . instead, the U.P. gqve;rnment .simply triod to buy the support of the ·miners· 
with wage risos 2nG , when it could .no longer do this, .found to its astonishment 
that the El Tonionte m{riers no longer felt a ny particular loyalty to opla~ · 
Unity. The U.P.' s solution to soaring inflation w2s s Chiloan ~ersion of 
threshold agreements - an automatic cost-of~living adjustmont - to be enforced 
by Parliamsnt. Neodlass to say, the necess8ry legislotion to carry through 
even this mongrc men.sure was continuously blocked by tho bourgeois parties in 
Congres$. In tho monntimo, tho government clamped down Qn th8 workers' 
committees, whi9h had been attempting to investigate 8nd rogul2te prices And 
distribution, 2~ a protection against hoar~ing , sabotage snd inflatio~. 
k 
The mine~s ~ snw no w2y out of their situation except strike action. Nothing 
hnd boGn dona to bre~k down their soctionol outlook. InstGad, thEy wore 
occused by the Communist Party of being sn 'nristocrncy of 12bour', who were 
hold~ng the nation to rnnsom. The minors wages were 8bove thG average lovol, 
but · only as a consequence of yoars of doterminod struggle in tho f2ce of the 
most appalling safety and health condition~ . The ovcrngc~ life oxpectnncy of 
a Chile2n -min2r is just over forty yo8rs. ThG Communist Party and the. Socialist 
Party orderod their members in the mines back to work, and tried to divide the 
w?rki~g class against the strikers. As in Britain, the miners did in somQ ways 
view chemselvos as 2 'special case', but · ih such o situation it was erimin8l to 
-1 s-· ·_ 
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both roinfo~ r ~ tt1is idea; and to offer no solution to the miners' demands. The 
strike went on for over n month, costing tho oconorny ovor 40 million dollars. 
Ultirn8tely, the bourgeoisio mocle offective use of the strike, championing the 
miners' cause and egging them on og~inst tho U.P. government. The striko was 
eventually put down by Allondo's 'professional' army. 
In Portugal today, tho Communist Party hos d8nounced os 'fascist' many of the 
defensive strugglos of the working class, thereby revealing their own impotenco 
to answor the workors' domonds and, indeGd, driving sections of tho more 
backward workers into thG arms of bourgoois reaction. 
Similar experionces were repeatod in industries which the workers themselves 
expropriated. Thoso movos woro msdo, not through tho lofty conviction that 
nationalisation was a good thing 9 but becauso the factory-owners had been 
closing down plants and enforcing lock-outs, as part of o systematic campaign 
to bring down tho U.P. government. Deprived of a livolihood, tho workers in 
theso industries attempted to safeguard production, and demanded that the acts 
of expropriation which they had accomplished, through directly occupying the 
factories, should be r2tified by the Popular Unity govornmont. However, the 
Economics Minister, Communist Party leador Orlando Millos, ordered that theso 
factories should be returnod to their former owners, and that the 'socinl 
sector' should bo maintuined 2t the levGl of nin8ty state-owned factories ~ 
- which the LI.Po hod decidGd was sufficient for tho time beingo In a manner 
r~miniscent of British 'moder2tes' in th8 Labour Party, arguing obout ~ho 
feasibility of nationalisation ..':!_~dG...££E..itll~~~!l2' the Chilean Communist Party 
th'e'o·retician 9 Volodia Tei telboim, w2rncd, 
.. 
'There must bo 2 savers readjustment in oconomic planning, self-financing, 
quality of production and sslary demnnds. State~ownGd industries must 
justify themselves economically and not wGigh down on tho Govornm8nt' 
(New York Timos, Fobruary, 1973) 
The Communist Party 2ccusod the workors who hod 'intervened' in the private 
sector of being 'economistic', of conducting tho strugglG purely on thG levol 
of material solf-intorest. Tho workers in industries already nationalised 
received better wagos, so thero was cortninly G very real oconomic incontive 
for the working class to favour nationalisation. But the Communist Party was 
adopting the desperate attitudo of bl~ming the working class itself for the 
impnsse tho U.P. government had arrived ot. The Communist Porty and Socialis·t 
Party londerships had donio·d tho workers any p_g_Jj. __ t,i_9_a}-~ control over tho 
capitalist class. Thoy now attackGcl tho workers for being too concerned about 
their economic con di ti on•, CJnd for irrcs ;:ionsi bl y provoking the bourgeo.isie. 
All underdoveloped countries hove, ~o a granter or losser oxtent,-· beGn ~nablo 
to modornise agriculture. Populnr Unity spoedod up Frei's land rGform, using 
the Christian Democrats' l8w to expropri2tu land of 80 hoctares in siz~. But 
as tho landownors and largo fnrmers b8gnn to take their rovonge, by cl~liborntol 
slaughtering cattle nnd hoording sood 8nd implemonts, Dnd os the pe~sants grew 
impntient, lnnd-seizures multiplied. The poasonts, including tho 250,000 r1cchup 
Indians in the South, exproprinted more and more land 1 causing tho U.P. 
government grave embarrassmont. Tho governmont's policy was one of paying 
compensation to tho landowners ond, sincG no mon8y W3s available to pay for 
~ 
these oxpropriations, thoy condomned tho pGasants ror being 'ultra - left', and 
having boon inspired by outside agitators. The agrarian reform was chaotic in 
character, complicGted by the untagonism botwe~n thG agricultural labourers 
and the smallholders. This l8tter group foared that th oir land would be taken 
8Woy 9 and saw no immedinte advantage in boing pnrt of 2 pGossnt cooperative. The 
former gro~p saw the petty proprietors, with their 2spir8tions towards owning 
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larger plots of land, as a major obstoclc to colloctivisation. The dislocation 
resulted in a fall in agricultur2l production. Thore was a virtual collapse of 
beef production, nnd imports of foodstuffs of nll kinds increased. 
The U. P. government had expocteq some teething problE.· .s with its agrarian 
reform policy, and hoped to use ~ts foreign exchange -- reserves ·ta · tido the 
country over temporarily •.. As. we have soen, those reserves were ·virtu·ally 
deploted. Food shortages, ·· therefore, _ be~0me. an increa~ingly serious· problem. 
The. agrari.an reform programme w.9s totally inadequate, relying as it .. did on 
. Frei's ·policies. In addition, tho ·. governm8nt took no stups to brec.k dowh tho 
differentiation within th8 ogricultural population, or between the workers 
- in the town and tho countryside. When the lorry-owners and distributive 
traders wont onto the offensive, hoarding food and hslting tho supply of 
seed and fortilisers, the government proved helpless. The Communist Party 
h3 d announced that it W8s launching 8 large sc8lG sowing programme in the 
countryside, but retreated as soon as tho flow of materials to carry out the 
programme was blocked. 
ThG peasant small-holders, like the rba~ petty bourgeoisie, neoded to be 
c~nvinced in practico of tho advantages of a socialist organisation of 
produttion. So long as they remained potty producors - and a successful 
colloctivisation programmemust rely on politic2l cgrc~mont , not coercion, 
when it comes to this stratum - these small farmers wore in desperato need 
of cheap credit. This neod could only have beon suppliod by the workers' 
nnd peasants' committGos exercising control over all brsnches of trade and 
banking. Steps were mado by tho peos8nts thomsolves to overcome somo of 
these problems, by setting up 'Communal Peasant Councils', which established 
links with the urbnn committoos to try and ensure food suppliGs during the 
'bassos' strikes'. But they found themselves being rostrained by the LI.Po 
leadors at each step, and WGre thcrofore unablo to goneralise and oxtond the 
rudimont2ry organisations they h3d erected. 
Popular Unity hod no strategy t.9 combot the internal nnd external problems 
which beset tho economy. The UoS.Ao 9 in particular, organised credit boyco~ts 
and refused to supply desperately needed sparo . p2rts or technical ossistonce 
for Chilean industry. The Chilean bourgeoisie was able to mobilise tho middle 
class agninst Allonde, os inflation sonrod, and they withdrew their tentative 
support for the LioPo government. Acts of direct snbotage mounted. The lorry 
owners' strikes of Octobor 1972 Gnd July 1973, the demonstrations by middle-
-class housewiv8s, closures of fDctorios- 2nd shops, whipping up of right~ · 
-wing hysteria and the increasingly 6onfideht sallies by the army and police 
into the industrial aros~ sot the stage for either civil wor - or 8 coup. 
. 1.,. ' 
The apparent insanity of the course Popular Unity had chosen to follow, was 
in fact nothing but tho logic of reformist politics · carried to its extreme. 
Having nttompted to perform · 3 balancing oct between Copitnl and Labour, the 
government had no altornnt~ve : bt to play for -time. Far from the 'ultra-left' 
hav~n~ provoked a coup, .it was :thG U 0 ~ government itself which hnd provoked 
both the capitalists and tho workers beyondenduronce, bringing down the full 
wrnth of the capitalists upon .t .he- ·workers' hends. 
. i . 
, 'I. I 1 
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'POPULAR POWER' AND A CRISIS OF LEADERSHIP 
In the countryside, in the cities, in the shanty-towns, the workers' r8llying 
cry became thot of 'poder popular' ~ populGr power. Local committcos for 
' production ond distribution wore organisGd by their thousands. Only 30% of 
Chile's workforce was actually organised insido trado unions 9 due to the 
uneven development of industry and tho multiplicity of small and medium 
size firms. The official tradG union structure, being dominated by the very 
parties which were inside the U.P. coalition, proved incapable of initiating 
strugglos adequate to moot the deoponing crisis confronting the working class. 
Therefore, _it fell on the more advanced workers to organise local committees 
for the purpose of taking some of the necessary steps. Often theso organisation 
were based on tho electoral committees which had been sot up to w2ge the 1970 
campnign, or were tr2nsformed versions of the bureaucratically controlled 
'self-management' bodies instituted under tho Frei governmont. 
Despite tho popular support that existed for the local committeos 9 they never 
involved the majority of the populationo But their enormous potontial lay in 
the fact that they were thrown up to moet the needs of all layers of tho 
.. .~-....---
wo rk in g class and self-employod poor. Housewives 9 the unomployod, the youth, 
and unorganised workers of Gll kinds, pnrticipated fully in these improvised 
organisntions. 'Cordones Industriales 1 linkod tho foctorius in oach area into 
industrial belts. 'Commandos Communalos' joined togethor tl10 factory workers, 
tho neighbourhood assomblies 9 tho womon's organisations 9 and the slm~dwellers 
on a geographic~l basis, 'Consejos Compesinos' united tho different layers 
of the agricultural population into rural counci1s. Rank and file mombors of 
the Communist Party and Socialist Party, and members of a number of smaller 
left gr8ups, workod together inside thoso committoes 9 which really came into 
their own from October 1972 onwards, when there was a pressing need to take 
independent action against the capitalist offensive. 
In March 1973, legislative elections were hold, and the results clearly 
reflected the class polarisation which had taken place since 1970. Instead of 
'uniting the nation' around its orientation of half-way measures, tho UoPo 
government had succeeded in reinforcing and polarising the existing divisions 
between classes. Popular Unity mado significant gains, as did the right-wing. 
The parties of the •centr2' had been undergoing internal schisms for some 
time. Within the U.P. government itself, the real forces of the class struggle 
made themselves felt; and presented seemingly insuperable problems. The unity 
of the government was threatened Rt times by the different solutions proposed 
by its members. As early as February, 1971, the Socialist Party Congress 
had stated, in a finai resolution, 
'Our objective is to catalyse mass 2ctions, to crush the resistance of 
our enemies, and to convert the process into an irreversible socialist 
path. We recognise that actions taken by certain workers have gone 
beyond the political directives issued by the UP, and have therefore 
challenged the power structureq The gensral congr~ss of the SP recognises 
that the different class composition of the UP is reflected in a 
government in which working-class, pe tty-bourgeois and bourgeois 
tendencies converge. These class contradictions within the UP will be 
overcome through the revoltion~ry energy of the working masses'(Le Monde 
In practice, tho Socialist Party leadership never translated these sentiments 
into a concrete political str2tegy. The Socialist Party was to the left of 
Allende and the Communist Party on most questions, but was equally hamstrung 
by its allegiance to the Popul2r Front. The Socialist Partyvs conception of 
'Popular Powor' amountod to the palliative of 'Workers' P8rticipation 1 9 
similar to what is boing offered to the British working class today by sections 
of the Labour Party and tho trade union leadership. It nmounted to a share 
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in the running of industry - or rather, colloctivo responsibil~ty alongside 
the capitalist class for the burdGn of propping up thoir docnying systom. 
The Left Critics 
..  -=---.. - ,.. ......... ..._.... ...... ... 
The loft-wing of the Soci alist Party bec2mo incrG8singly discontonted with 
the conciliatory policies of their l8adors. Together with a section of MAPU 
( n loft brGak-aW8Y group from tho Christian Democrats), and the MIR (Movement 
of tho RovolutionGry Left), they voicGd criticisms of tho stratogy basod 
upon a 'marringo ' of tho working clas s and middle class. ·Mombers of these 
organisations tonded to bo tho most active in tho local committees, and 
thorofore played an important rolu in dcts rmining whnt forms of 'dual power', 
if any, wore to bo crea tod. 
' - . 
'Dual power', th2t is, a situation in which tho working class is on tho brink 
of oxproprioting the capitalis t class and s8izing stats powor, was nevor 
arrivod at in Chilo during tho AllGndo years. In strikGs and in occupations, 
organisations for the workers' own defence~ such as striko committoes, 
picket lines and, in a widospread or general strike, committoos linking up 
diffor8nt factoriGs and organisations for distribution, are froquently thrown 
up in the courso of strugglo. For as long es thoy oxist, and tho further 
they extend themsGlves, they represont organisations for workers' control of 
producti.on and distribution, prosenting a threat to the capitalist class 
insofor as they tend towards developing into organs of 'dual power'. 
In Chile, urnbryonic organs of dua l pou1 or existed l ocnlly 9 within nnd botwoun 
individual factories. The tosk of revolutionaries in such a situation is to 
generaliso and advance those devolopmonts, providing a clear political load 
~s to -~Q..~~b-~-~t tho workers should 8dvanco, and~-~· Exhortations simply to 
'organisG', 'nrm' and so forth, aro not only sperflos~ the working class 
takes tho elomentary stops to defend itsolf whon under attack - they are also 
misleading 3nd dangerouso Given that millions of Chiloans believed in the 
'Chiloan Road to Socialism' right up to the end, and in spite of the fact 
that they often wont f a r beyond the narrow confines of U.Po constitutionalism 
of their own accord, thG contrnl job for revolutionarios was to demonstrate to 
the workors that they wero being lud up a blind alloy, and that thoro was 
another - a r e volutionary - alternative. 
How did tho 'left' critics of the U.P. government ma tch up to this task? When 
Allende took offico, one of the first questions asked by socialists, convincGd 
of the nGed to destroy, rather than mako uso of, tho bourgeois state, was as 
follows - should thoy be 'inside' or 'outside ' tho U0 P. coa lition? Merely to 
ask th'is quGstion 9 howEJve r 9 i s to pos e· the problem wrongly. The primary question 
at ?11 timos is that of how to pursue a n -~n_d_o_pe_f!.d2!,1;~ working class strategy -· 
- indepondent, that i s , of thG bourgeoisio. In tho Chile0n situntion it was 
totally inadequnte to simply point out that the stat8 W8s an instrument of 
tho bourgooisie. The mnjority of tho Chilean working class looked to the 
~.. govornment for loaders hip, 2nd were dominnted by reformist idoology,Rlbeit 
in the guise of r ndicGl roformi s m. It was nocess ary to win the working class 
away from their loador s hip. Thi s could only have been done by mobilising tho 
~orkors on the issues which directly affected thorn, qn demands which were 
s~en by the working cluss tc be nocess ary for th s defence of their interests. 
Given the hegemony of Popula r Unity ove r th s 12bour movment, revolutionaries 
should h2VB CEJ lled on the /\ll enclo rGgime to t s kc up, 2nd fight for, those 
dornands. 
In order to fight for an indopendent working class position, on each and 
evory issue, the workers' parti es woulci havG ha d to bronk from the partios 
of the bourgeoisi e . Revolutionari os should ha vo demand8d that this break 
~e m~d~, and that the worke r s ' pE1rties form a "workers' government''.• The 
inability of tho Popula r Unity l eadur s to fight for tho ciemnnds which tho 
' . 
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workGrs themselves saw to be nocessary, and their unwillingness to break with 
the bourgeois parties, would have begun the process of ~~akening th e infl~ence 
of Allende over the workGrs' movomont. 
Instead, groups like tho MIR, rGfusod to struggle to win the working class 
away from its loadorship. They eithor ignored tho reformist leadership, or 
capitulated to it - setting themse lves up as left--wing critics of tho Allondci 
regime. Tho parties designated 'ultra-left' by the Communist a~ty, 'in fact 
lagged way behind thG mc:iss movement most of the time. Tho ~1 IR, ··1n p2rticular, 
was soon as an arch-enemy of the U. P. govurnment., because it urge.d the 
workers to occupy more factorio~, and the peasants to seize more land. Tho 
MIR was relatively ineffectual given its small ~ize, but it could have 
provided tho !Gad required, and thereby grown enormously, if it had not 
adopted a course which constantly compromised with ·th8 politics of Popular 
Unity. FoundGd in 1965, tho MIR initinlly followBd a guorrillaist strategy, 
under tho influence of the Cuban revolution. It did not organise amongst the 
working class until ~?.!_t_~_£ Allende' s victory, and foiled throughout tho U.P. 
years to put forward any kind of cloar, altorn2tivo programme to that of 
Popular Unity. Having abstoino.d in the 1970 elections, the MIR later offered 
'critical support' to the governmont. What this moant was that, although, 
unlike tho left-wing of tho Socialist Party, the MIR was organisationally 
outside the coalition govornmont, it was just as 'tiod politically to it as 
all the member parties. Tho only way the Chilean masses could have boon won 
to a revolutionary position,would have been through th8ir being mobilised 
around a ~ro~~amme which was in every way frou of class-collibor2tionist 
politics. 
And what of the mass workers' parties? Why -~-i.9_ the Communist Party, ab.ave all, 
pursuo· a co~rse of such blatant closs-collaboration? Why did the 'socialist' 
states of the Soviet Union, Eastorn Europe, China, and all ths other. ''workers' 
states'', not come to tho assistance of tho besoiged Chilean oconomy? Why did 
they offer only the most minimal amounts of assistance? Cla~s-coll0aboration . 
is only the most concrete expression of having abandonsd any pretence of 
holding to an indepondent working clnss programmo. Tho motley crow which 
formod the U.P. goverhment befitted tho roformist programme of Popular Unity. 
Tho Communist artio~ policies, throughout tho world, reflect tho process of 
degeneration which has ttken place inside the Soviet Union. Russia's isolation 
and backwardness ofter 1917 took its toll, and the domination of tho world 
market by the imperialist powers made the transition from capitalism to 
socialism an exceedingly difficult task for the first country to achieve a 
victorious ' proletarian revolution. The 'thoory' of 'socialism in one country' 
- that is ·~ of the pos~ibility of building socialism in one nation statG - was 
-..-... .... .,.# 
an attempt by tho Soviet bureaucracy to mako a virtue out of a ~ecossity. It 
was ~ocessRry to begin tho process of building towards socinlism in the USSR. 
But the bureoucracy stopped halfway and, rathor than confront tho onerous 
task thoy faced, they abandoned nll hopo of ;Jn intorn2tion2list revolutionary 
perspective. Socialism in one country is an impossibility, given the complete 
interdependence of the world ecohomy. But this theory 9 with modifications 
today=undor the title of 'dotonto 1 and 'pencoful coexistence' , has been the· 
guiding light for Communist Partios overywheto. In practice it has mBRnt 
subordinating the interests of revolutionary movements to tho neods 
of tho Soviot bur82ucr2cy, and imposing on the workors and peasants of the · 
Third World a 'modul' of socialism-in-staoos. 
. . . ~ 
' Thus, the Chilean Ccimmunist Party could ally with tho so-callod progressive 
bourgeoisie, because it ar9uod that this class was anti-feudal nnd anti~ 
-imperialist, and would. therefore gradually froo its pooplo from the worst 
excesses of imporiclist domination .. The EastEJrn bloc's _do ton tu ~i th thG 
West would be threatened by fostering 8 ronlly dotormincd anti~imperialist 
movemont, namely, ono lod by the prol2tGriot, ; and thorcfore tho Communist 
Party plac~d its bets on tho Chilean bourgeoisie instead. 
I 
_, 
Which Ro nL·· ? 
~-.;.;;;..-------
As the threat of a coup became daily more certain, the rosponso of tho 
government was akin to that of 2n ostrich. Popular Unity nttempted to either 
suppross, or take over, tho workers' d8fonsivo organisations. Bureaucratically 
run 'supply ond control boards' (J.A.P. s ) wero sot up 9 supposedly to curb the 
rnging inflotion,and rampnnt hoarding 8nd spoculstion. Thos8 boards were 
inoffoctunl.- Thoy were manned by civil servnnts and, later, by membors · of the 
military. Tho only effect they had wns to channel tho frustrotion of somo of 
the workers into safer outlets. At this point, tho left.-wing organisations 
should huve been pointing tho finger firmly at the reformist leadors, who 
had loci the workers 2long o road which oponcd up the prospoct of rovolution - or 
counter-revolution. Thoy should havo been ruthlossly exposing the bankruptcy 
of this l 8adership, by dom2nding that it tnko immediate steps to clamp down 
on the ho3rding, speculntion 2nd sabotage, thnt it onforco really affective 
price controls onci rationing in tho f3ce of sooring inflntion nnd that it 
oxpropriatewithout compensntion those industtios nocoss ory to the running of 
8 plannod economy. Revolutionaries should: havo . demonded that Popular Unity 
plnco itsolf .·o t the forefront of a struggle to dofoi:id the gains that had beon 
achieved 8nd to oxtond them further, on the basis of the committees for workers' 
control of production s nd di s tribution which hnd been spontanoously crouted. 
If thGy could not or would not do this, they would hove to get out of tho woy. 
Insto3d, tho MIR and other left-wing groups, eithor sowed illusions in the 
'solf-activity' of the worker~' committocs - o levEl of solf-activity which 
provod hopolessly inadequate when it corn8 to tho crunch - or r ologa ted tho 
workors to 0 passive role of w2iting 8nd wntching. Thousands of working-class 
mon ond womon flockod to the PresidGntiol pa l oce, to seok an 'audience' with 
Allende, in the hope that ho must have prepared contingency plans to countor 
the c2pitalists' offonsivo. They were dis appointod. Popular Unity had no 
contingency plans. 
The trans ition from C8pitalism to socialism Cunnot bo nccomplished without 
oxorcisi8g tho strictost control ovGr capita l and commodities~ Imporiolism 
hammers at tho door of a young, socialist s t ot e with its cheap imports and 
superior technology - os woll 2s bursting through st the first opportunity 
with armed intervention. Nativo copit2l fl oes the country or ottompts to 
sabot3go tho oconomy which hos deprivod it of its wealth. All of this i s 
inevitablo. Tho bourgeoisi8 will not lot go of its power without o fGrociou s 
strugglc • . Thoref8re, 8 monopoly ovor for eign trade i s u fir s t pro~reqisite 
for ocheiving s oci ali sm 0 Such a monopoly, in tho hcnds ~o f o worke r s ' s tnt8 9 
is both an instrument for planning tho oconomy 2nd for protecting it ogainst 
tho cGpitulists . In PortugGl, bankworkers took steps to prevent the c2pitalist 
class from withdr2wing its depos its to SwitzGrland, and elsewh or e , a ftor the 
coup which toppled the Coetano rogimc. In Chilo, revolution2rios s hould ha ve 
agitatod for the workers themsolvos to exorci se this kind of control ovor financo 
capit8l, and s hould hnvc domnndod that tho Popular Unity governmont take 
control of both 211 foreign trade, ond tho wholo banking and fin ance sector. 
Above all~ in ardor to defend the property expropri oted from tho capitalist 
class, th e workors must bo nrmed . For r ovolutionari os 1 thi s doos not mean 
oxhortntions about 'the ormod ro od , tho only ro od '. Workors militias and 
oth8 r orgoni s8tions for physical self-defence must be cro2tGd us p2rt and 
parcel af an ovoroll str otegy , as the nucossary t0ctics for carrying out 
2 revolution8ry strot~gy. The U.P. loaders, ns we ha ve seen , ins isted that 
tho ormGd forcos wer8 neutr2l. Tt-,0 y wont further, and seiz ed tho a rms of 
thoso workors who did not bolieve them and who h8d been clandestinely 
building up arms caches 2nd sottinc up slf~dc fonco corps, b8sEd on tho 
'cordones '. Whon potty officers and ~th e lower r anks in thG Navy threatenod 
to mutiny 2gainst thoir officers, who they kn ew to bo preparing s coup, thoy 
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wero convictGd with tho full support of Allende. Repression inside tho armod 
forces. dirG~ted at supportors of Popular Unity, was carried out systom~tic­
ally by tho highor ranks, without any protost from the government. The army 
· and the polico staged. dress-rohearsals for the terror they were to unleash 
on tho workers aftor the coup, throughout th e months loading up to Septomber 
-, - brutalising and arresting militants in tho industrial bolts and the 
colintrysidoo -
The MIR acted os if tho re~ponse bf the U.P. leaders wos only to bo expected, 
and, instead of ch allenging ·thsm,countcrpcsod its own tactic of clandestine 
arming to the opon betrayals of tho workers' leadors. Instead of calling on 
the government to mobilis e tho workers for armod self-dofonce, as the pro~poct 
of a coup became inevitAble: instoad of organising in tho r ank and file ' of the 
armed forces ~nd creating a polo of attraction for them ' through th o initiatives 
takon by tho workers' movomont~ instoad of ~roposi~g a united front of all 
forces willing to unite in nction simply to defend- the workers' movement 
against tho imminent coup, the MIR fotally reliod on its own? puroly 'military' 
methods to take on the armed forces of tho state. 
The March 1973 election res ults sounded tho nlarm for th e bourgeoisie. Their 
attempt to undermine All ende's elector2l base had f ailed. They would therefore 
have t6 und ci rmino tho constitution itself? nnd resort to 'illegal' measures. 
Allende responded to the warning sign0ls in typical fashion, by taking 
several leading Gen erals into his cabinet in th e hope that they could effect 
one last compromise. An abortivo coup was staged in Jun e - a mere warm~~p for 
tho final blow. As the Gonerals prepnrod to move, Allendo onsconcod himself 
in the Moned2 palaco to awnit the worst. Tho Gritish Communist Party claims 
that, 
'The plotters of the coup were only 5 people , who kopt it a secrot' 
(Comment, op.cit.) 
This conspiratorial 'explanotion' flies in the faco of all tho facts. Tho 
heads of the army, tho Chilean bourgooisie 9 and th e u.s. State Department 
had beon 'plotting' tho coup over since 1970. 
The work~rs saw th o writing on the wall, but had boon politically and 
militarily di~-armed by their bankrupt loadsrships. When the time was ripe, 
when tho country was in a stat8 of economic ch ci os, and when the workers wBre 
seen to be demobilisod, the Gonarals struck, and unlBashed a bloodbath on 
the Chilean people beyond the wildest nightmare of th e timorous reformists 1 
who had wanted, at all costs, to 8Void a civil war. 
, . 
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SOLIDARITY WITH THE CHILEAN RESISTANCE!!! 
-. 
How many more times will the working class .ha ve to nay for the betrayals of 
its reformist leader~hip? The Allende regime , and th~ strategy of 'Popular 
Unity', were by ~o moans uniqu e . Reliance on soctions 6f the bourgeoisi e , · 
placing of f aith in the sta t e apparatus and the army 7 and substitution of 
parliamentary manoeuvres f9r tho independ8nt mobilisation of the masses, .has 
led to successive dGfeats for the working class throughout Latin Amorica 
and throughout the wqrld. 
-· 
The military takeover in Uruguay 12st year was mRdG possible by the r8formist 
perspoctive of th e 'Fronte . Amplio'~ a Popular Unity type formation, modolling 
itself on Chile. Alli ances w~~h bourgeois politicians, ~n~ · army gon~rals,~liko 
Torres in Bolivia, General Sorigni in Urugu a y 8nd Peron in Argentina, has ·led 
to tho immobilisation of the working class. 
Behind tho various forms of 'populnr coalitions 9 lies the orient·ution· of · 
tying the masses to their own borgeoisi~s. Thes8 a ll~class alliances are 
seon as a nec8ss a ry preludo for achioving socialism. The'stages'theory of 
the~commnist Parties - defe2 t imperialism today and fight for socialism 
tomorrow - f a ils to understand th a t these s trugglGs are inseparablo. Tho weak 
bourgeoisi e of the Third World, closely ti e d to imperialism, is not capable 
of taking port in a strggl~ ngninst its own bene factors. At the samo timo, 
undor certain conditions, th e bourgcoisio is willing to 'collaborate' with 
the workers' partios in ardor to presGrve tho cnpit2list systGm. They will 
us e the brea thing space granted them by a 'Popula r Unity' government, to 
regroup and work out thoir own solutions. Whilo Luis Corvnl2n, leader of the 
Chiloan Communi s t Party, assurod th o army of his continuing faith in them, 
the bourgeoisio wns ge tting ready to rea p the fruits of cl8ss collaboration 
... 
in its own wa y. 
Th e disasterous consequencGs of the strategy of Popular Fronts have been 
demonstrRted ovor and ovor again. In Indonesi n 9 it led to Suharto's coup nnd 
the massacre of _· hnlf a million. In Spain 9 in the 1930's, popular frontism 
resulted in the dofeat of tho Spanish working cl8ss by fascism. In Chino, in 
the 192D's, the Communist Party was orde r od by Moscow to ally itself with 
th8 bourgoois partios, with the r osult th2t th e Kuomintong inflictod a t e rrible 
defeat on . the Chinese workers. Chilo is the l a test e~~ple in ~ long chain. 
The lessons of Chile ha ve not been l Garnto The doad-ond str~ tegy of class-
-colloborotion s till gu ides many organisations of the internation2l working 
class. Toda y9 ·in Portugal 9 th o Communist Party 2nd Socialist Party, are · 
pursuing the same policies of clnss~collabor2tion with Spinola - orguing of 
course tha t Portugal i$ spoci a l 9 i s un1qu e . In Franc e , the Communist Party 
domin~ted 'Union of the ·Left t assurod th~ French bourgooisie, in the recent 
elections, that 'there i s no risk of the ·communists os tablishing a hegemony'~ 
In Italy, tho Genoral Sec r ot 8ry of the Communist Party, clenrly spells out -
whnt ~ th o y w2,n t 9 
'This i s why wo t olk not Clbout a iiloft--wing" alterna tivo, but n . 
"democrntic alternativen , th 8t i s 9 u political prospect of coll2bora tion 
anJ - ngreoment among the populcir forcos of Communist nncJ Soci8lis t 
inspiration and the populnr forc es of Catholic inspira tion, togethor 
with form a tions of other democratic oriontotions' (Comment) · 
Tho irreconcilab l e contradictions between th8 intor csts of the working clGss 
and those of intcrnatiohal c8pita l, a r G s wept Qndor tho c2rpet in the nam~ 
of sorno vaguo 'democrocy'. Hor o in Britain th o right-wing and fascist · 
org . t. ' ' . . 1 . . . nnisa ions or o growino 0 Tho financinl oid thnt tho ruling .c ass 18 giving. ~o such orgnnisC1ti an·s indicotos th8t when tho strug.glo botwe un classes ·is 
~n~~~~ificd, the bourgooisio, unlik e tho r e formist leade rship, will not bo 
in 1 ited by the ' democratic process'. 
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As the cnpitalist crisis deepens, the petty bourgeoisie becomes more and 
more desperate, and will turn to th8 ~~ght if no alternative is offerod by 
tho parties of the working class. Fascism grows due to the inability of the 
reformist leadership to fight resolt~ly for the interests of the working 
class. Tho petty bourgeoisie, far .from fearing violence, turns, in its frenzy, 
to the. most violent methods and bGcomes a venomous enemy of the working class. 
The Chilean experience teachesus this lesson, namely, that socialism will 
only be cre8tod through mobilising all the exploited and oppress~d behind 
the most resolute and progressive class - the proletariat. The proletotiat 
will only succeed in acting as a vanguard when it is armed with a programme 
that draws all those layers into struggle against the bourgeoisio, for the 
seizure of s~ate power. The British Lcbour Party's consistent compromises with 
the.: .'floating voters' will only drive the potty bourgeoisie into the camp of 
renction. 
Internationalism 
- .. 
The Labour Govornmont displays its reformist character most clearly on the 
question of internationalism. On May Day marches and at Annual Conferences, 
Labour leaders will shed buckets of tears for the plight of the workers of 
Chile, South Africa 1 Cyprus and so on. They will defend the rights of oppressed 
minorities and oppressed nations from the sofety of the rostrum. However, 
when it comes to its own backyard, in Ireland, the La bour Government does not 
even bother to justify pursuing a policy identical to that of the Tories. 
British troops in Ireland are the expression of the Labour Party's notion of 
'internationalism'. 
At tho Labour Party Conference in October 1973, the Labour leadership pledged 
to break of all trade 9 diplomatic and military relations with thLl Chilean junta, once olected to office. Once in office, however, James Callaghan 
reprimanded Eric Heffer for publicly reminding tho Government of its pre-election 
promises. Callaghan argued, like Allende, that, *Ministers have to make 
decisions which are sometimes unplensant'. This 'roalistic' approach is a 
poorly disguised cover for defending the realism of the capitalist class 
2gainst the interests of tho working class. 
The realism of tho ~..9_rJ<jng __ c_l_q,s_f? is based on its independent activity and 
internationalism. ~e mobilisation of the British working class in solidarity 
with the Chilean resistcnce t8lls the British bourgeoisie that our interests 
lie with the Latin American workors and peasants, not with you and your 
constitution. Tho vury samo constitution that you use tci prevent Os fr~m 
assisting our Chilean comrades, you use to jail the Shrewsbury b~ilding 
workers, fine the Clay Cross Councillors, harass immigrants and oppress the 
Irish poopl2. Tho same instinct that leads you to send credits and investments 
to prop up the military junta in Chilo, leads you to jail pickets and to attack 
our trade unions. Wo are also rGalistic, and if the Labour Govornmcnt cl~imo 
to represent the interests of its working class supporters, thon you must 
demonstrate your solidarity with the Chilean resistance in a realistic way • 
. So)idarity. 
The British Communist Party has called on all democrats and progrsssives to 
campaign for the restoration of democracy in Chile. Whilst we must fight to 
restore the basic democratic civil liberties denied to the Chilean workers, 
there can be no disguising of the fact that the strugglu for dGmocrbcy and for 
socislism are inseparably linked. Thero will be no stablG period of bourgeois 
democratic government for the Chilean people. The world is being rocked by 
violent ~nd tml~osovants,which point daily to tho conclusion that the only 
altorn2tive to the continuing dictatorship of the bourgeoisie is for the 
working class to seize power, nnd rule in its own name. Tho Communist Party . 
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has learnt nothing and forgotten nothing. It continuos to offer the 'Chilean 
Road', tho 'Portuguese Road' and tho 'British Road' to socialism, to tho 
working class sll ovGr tho world. The lessons of Chile serve as a warning to 
all socialists, that 311 these 'roads' lead to tho same disaster. The British 
working class must not forget this tragedy. 
The task of building an international Chilo Solidarity Campaign, to assist the 
Chilean resistance against the junta, is an urgent priority. Differences of 
opinion on the Chilean experience should not act as a borrier to united 
action on demands which aro objectively in the interest of the Chilean 2nd 
British working class. The Revolutionary Communist Group is actively working 
towards the building of a mass solidarity c2mpaign to aid tho Chiloan poople. 
All organisations, all sections of the labour movement, and all individuals, 
ready to fight for an end to all diplomatic, militaryand trading relations 
with the junta, should affiliate to, and participatB in thB Chile Solidarity 
Campnign. 
Participation in a solidarity movement must be croated on tho broadest possible 
basis if it is to be effective.Only in this manner will tho Chile Solidarity 
Campaign lGad to concroto forms of solidarity for thG Chilean people, and 
onsuro that tho campaign will not just load to papar resolutions, but to 
the bl2cking of trade with Chilo and other forms of real working class support. 
No ono organisation has tho right to demand that its own particulor analysis, 
programme and demands should bo accopted in full by the solidarity movement. 
Such a condition would precludo any possibility of unity in aotion. 
The Revolutionary Communist Group will continue to work towards this unity 
in action. The domancs wo support and fight for,sro the demDnds which are 
ossential to an indcpendGnt working class programmco Wo do not occept slognns 
which in any way compromise tho independence and the objective interests of 
the internntional working clnss movement. Unity in action does not obsolve 
revolutionaries of thoir responsibility to raise tho lessons of Chile 
throughout tho labour movement. Tho Revolutionary Communist Group will do 
everything within its moans to ensure that tho lessons of Chilo will be learnt!!! 
VICTORY TO THE CHILEAN REVOLUTION. 
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